(Reconciliation through proper
I.1.1 Now, therefore, the enquiry into
I.1.2 (Brahman is that) from which the
origin etc., (i.e. the origin, sustenance and dissolution) of this
I.1.3 The scripture being the source of
I.1.4 But that (Brahman is to be known only
from the Scriptures and not independently by any other means is
established), because it is the main purpose (of all Vedantic texts).
I.1.5 On account of seeing (i.e. thinking
being attributed in the Upanishads to the First Cause, the Pradhana) is
not (the first cause indicated by the Upanishads; for) it (Pradhana) is
not based on the scriptures.
I.1.6 If it be said
that (the word ‘seeing’ or thinking) is used in a secondary sense, (we
say) not so, because of the word Atman being applied to the cause of the
I.1.7 (The Pradhana cannot be designated by
the term Self) because Salvation is declared to one who is devoted to
I.1.8 And (the Pradhana cannot be denoted by
the word ‘Self’), because it is not stated (by the scriptures) that It
(Sat) has to be discarded.
I.1.9 On account of (the individual) merging
in its own Self (the Self cannot be the Pradhana.
I.1.10 On account of the uniformity of view
(of the Vedanta texts, Brahman is to be taken as that cause.
I.1.11 And because it is directly stated in
the Sruti (therefore the all-knowing Brahman alone is the cause of the
I.1.12 Anandamaya means Para Brahman on
account of the repetition (of the word ‘bliss’ as denoting the Highest
I.1.13 If (it be objected that the term
Anandamaya consisting of bliss can) not (denote the supreme Self)
because of its being a word denoting a modification or transformation or
product (we say that the objection is) not (valid) on account of
abundance, (which is denoted by the suffix ‘maya’.
I.1.14. And because he is declared to be the
cause of it (i.e. of bliss; therefore ‘maya’ denotes abundance or
I.1.15 Moreover that very Brahman which has
been re-referred to in the Mantra portion is sung (i.e. proclaimed in
the Brahmana passage as the Anandamaya.
I.1.16 (Brahman and) not the other (i.e. the
individual soul is meant here) on account of the impossibility (of the
I.1.17 And on account of the declaration of
the difference (between the two i.e. the one referred to in the passage
‘The Self consisting of bliss’ etc. and the individual soul, the latter
cannot be the one referred to in the passage.
I.1.18 Because of wishing or willing in the
scriptural passage we cannot say even inferentially that Anandamaya
I.1.19 And moreover it, i e., the scripture,
teaches the joining of this, i.e., the individual soul, with that, i.e.,
consisting of bliss (Anandamaya) when knowledge is attained.
I.1.20 The being within (the Sun and the
eye) is Brahman, because His attributes are taught therein.
I.1.21 And there is another one (i.e. the
Lord who is different from the individual souls animating the Sun etc.)
on account of the declaration of distinction.
I.1.22 The word Akasa
i.e., ether here is Brahman on account of characteristic marks (of that
i.e. Brahman being mentioned.
I.1.23 For the same
reason the breath also refers to Brahman.
I.1.24 The ‘light’ is Brahman, on account of
the mention of feet in a passage which is connected with the passage
about the light.
I.1.25 If it be said that Brahman is not
denoted on account of the metre Gayatri being denoted, we reply not so,
because thus i.e. by means of the metre the application of the mind on
Brahman is declared; because thus it is seen (in other passages also.
I.1.26 And thus also (we must conclude,
viz., that Brahman is the subject or topic of the previous passage,
where Gayatri occurs) because (thus only) the declaration as to the
beings etc. being the feet is possible.
I.1.27 If it be said (that Brahman of the
Gayatri passage cannot be recognised in the passage treating of ‘light’)
on account of the difference of designation or the specification (we
reply) no, because in either (designation) there is nothing contrary (to
I.1.28 Prana is Brahman, that being so
understood from a connected consideration (of the passage referring to
I.1.29 If it be said that (Brahman is) not
(denoted or referred in these passages on account of) the speaker’s
instruction about himself, we reply not so, because there is abundance
of reference to the Inner Self in this (chapter or Upanishad.
1.1.30 The declaration (made by Indra about
himself, viz., that he is and with Brahman) is possible through
intuition as attested by Sruti, as in the case of Vamadeva.
I.1.31 If it be said that (Brahman is) not
(meant) on account of characteristic marks of the individual soul and
the chief vital air (being mentioned); we say no, because (such an
interpretation) would enjoin threefold meditation (Upasana), because
Prana has been accepted (elsewhere in the Sruti in the sense of Brahman)
and because here also (words denoting Brahman) are mentioned with
reference to Prana.
I.2.1 (That which consists of the mind
‘Manomaya’ is Brahman) because there is taught (in this text) (that
Brahman which is) well-known (as the cause of the world) in the
I.2.2 Moreover the qualities desired to be
expressed are possible (in Brahman; therefore the passage refers to
I.2.3 On the other hand, as (those
qualities) are not possible (in it) the embodied (soul is) not (denoted
by Manomaya etc.
I.2.4 Because of the declaration of the
attainer and the object attained. He who consists of the mind (Manomaya)
refers to Brahman and not to the individual soul.
I.2.5 Because of the difference of words.
I.2.6 From the Smriti also (we know the
embodied self or the individual soul is different from the one referred
to in the text under discussion.
I.2.7 If it be said that (the passage does)
not (refer to Brahman) on account of the smallness of the abode
(mentioned i.e. the heart) and also on account of the denotation of that
(i.e. of minuteness) we say, No; because (Brahman) has thus to be
meditated and because the case is similar to that of ether.
I.2.8 If it be said that (being connected
with the hearts of all individual souls to) Its (Brahman’s)
Omnipresence, it would also have experience (of pleasure and pain) (we
say) not so, on account of the difference in the nature (of the two.
I.2.9 The Eater (is Brahman), because both
the movable and immovable (i.e. the whole world) is taken (as His food.
I.2.10 And on account of the context also
the (eater is Brahman.
I.2.11 The two who have entered into the
cavity (of the heart) are indeed the individual soul and the Supreme
Soul, because it is so seen.
I.2.12 And on account of the distinctive
qualities (of the two mentioned in subsequent texts.
I.2.13 The person within (the eye) (is
Brahman) on account of (the attributes mentioned therein) being
appropriate (only to Brahman.
I.2.14 And on account of the statement of
place and so on.
I.2.15 And on account of the passage
referring to that which is distinguished by bliss (i.e. Brahman.
I.2.16 And on account of the statement of
the way of him who has known the Truth of the Upanishads.
I.2.17 (The person within the eye is the
Supreme Self) and not any other (i.e. the individual soul etc.) as these
do not exist always; and on account of the impossibility (of the
qualities of the person in the being ascribed to any of these.
I.2.18 The internal ruler over the gods and
so on (is Brahman) because the attributes of that (Brahman) are
I.2.19 And (the Internal Ruler is) not that
which is taught in the Sankhya Smriti (viz., Pradhana) because qualities
contrary to its nature are mentioned (here.
I.2.20 And the individual soul (is not the
Internal Ruler) for both also (i.e. both recensions viz., the Kanva and
Madhyandina Sakhas of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad) speak of it as
different (from the Internal Ruler.)
I.2.21 The possessor of qualities like
indivisibility etc., (is Brahman) on account of the declaration of Its
I.2.22 The other two (viz. the individual
soul and the Pradhana) are not (the source of all beings) for
distinctive attributes and differences are stated.
I-2-23 And on account of its form being
mentioned (the passage under discussion refers to Brahman.
I.2.24 (Vaisvanara (is Brahman) on account
of the distinction qualifying the common terms ("Vaisvanara" and "Self".
I.2.25 Because that (cosmic form of the
Supreme Lord) which is described in the Smriti is an indicatory mark or
inference (from which we infer the meaning of this Sruti text under
I.2.26 If it be said that (Vaisvanara is)
not (Brahman) or the Highest Lord on account of the term (viz.,
Vaisvanara which has a different settled meaning viz., gastric fire)
etc., and on account of his abiding within (which is a characteristic of
the gastric fire) (we say) no, because there is the instruction to
conceive (Brahman) as such (as the gastric fire, because it is
impossible for the gastric fire to have the heaven etc., for its head
and other limbs) and also because they (the Vajasaneyins) describe him
(viz. the Vaisvanara) as man (which term cannot apply to the gastric
I.2.27 For the same reasons (the Vaisvanara)
cannot be the deity (fire) or the element (fire).
I.2.28 Jaimini (declares that there is) no
contradiction even (if by Vaisvanara) (Brahman is) directly (taken as
the object of worship).
I.2.29 On account of the manifestation, so
I.2.30 For the sake of meditation or
constant remembrance – so says the sage Badari.
I.2.31 Because of imaginary identity the
Supreme Lord may be called Pradesamatra (span long). So says Jaimini
because so (the Sruti) declares.
I.2.32 Moreover they (the Jabalas) teach
that this (Supreme Lord is to be meditated upon) in this (the space
between the head and the chin).
I.3.1 The abode of heaven, earth, etc., (is
Brahman) on account of the term, ‘own’ i.e., ‘Self’.
I.3.2 Because of the declaration (in the
scriptures) that that is to be attained by the liberated.
I.3.3 (The abode of heaven etc.) is not that
which is inferred i.e. Pradhana because there is no term indicating it.
I.3.4 (Nor) also the individual soul.
I.3.5 (Also) on account of the declaration
of difference (between) individual soul and the abode of heaven etc.
I.3.6 On account of the subject matter.
I. 3.7 And on account of the two conditions
of remaining unattached and eating (of which the former is
characteristic of the Supreme Self, the latter of the individual soul).
I.3.8 Bhuma (is Brahman) because it is
taught after the state of deep sleep (i.e. after Prana or the vital air
which remains awake even in that state).
I.3.9 And because the attributes (declared
in the scriptural passage to Bhuma) apply appropriately only to Para
I.3.10 The Imperishable (is Brahman) on
account of (its) supporting everything up to Akasa (ether).
I.3.11 This (supporting) on account of the
command (attributed to the Imperishable, can be the work of the Supreme
Self only and not of the Pradhana).
I.3.12 And on account of (the Sruti)
separating (the Akshara) from that nature is different (from Brahman).
I.3.13 Because of His being mentioned as the
object of sight, He (who is to be meditated upon is Brahman).
I.3.14 The small (ether, Akasa, is Brahman)
on account of the subsequent arguments or expression).
I.3.15 The small Akasa (ether) is Brahman on
account of the action of going (into Brahman) and of the word
(Brahmaloka); because thus it is seen (i.e. the individual souls go into
Brahman) is seen elsewhere in other Sruti texts; and this daily going of
the souls into Brahman (during deep sleep) is an inferential sign by
means of which we may properly interpret the word ‘Brahmaloka’).
I.3.16 Moreover on account of the supporting
also (attributed to it) the small ether must be Brahman, because this
greatness is observed in this (Brahman only according to other
I.3.17 Also because of the well-known
meaning (of Akasa as Brahman the small Akasa is Brahman).
I.3.18 If it is said that the other one
(i.e. the individual soul) is meant on account of a reference to it
(made in a complementary passage) (we say) no, on account of the
I.3.19 If it be said that for subsequent
texts (it appears that the individual soul is meant, we say that what is
there referred to is) rather (the individual soul in so far) as its real
nature has become manifest (i.e. as it is non-different from Brahman).
I.3.20 And the reference (to the individual
soul) is for a different purpose.
I.3.21 If it be said that on account of the
scriptural declaration of the smallness (of the ether) (the Brahman
cannot be meant) (we say that) that has already been explained.
I.3.22 On account of the acting after (i.e.
the shining after) (that after which sun, moon, etc. are said to shine
is the Supreme Self) and I.3.23 Moreover the Smriti also speaks of him
i.e. Brahman to be the universal light.
I.3.24 From the very word (viz., the term
Lord applied to it) the (person) measured (by the size of the thumb) (is
I. 3 25 But with reference to the heart (the
highest Brahman is said to be of the size of a thumb) as man alone is
entitled (to the study of the Vedas, to practise meditation and attain
I.3.26 Also (beings) above them (viz., men)
(are entitled for the study and practice of the Vedas) on account of the
possibility (of it) according to Badarayana.
I.3.27 If it be said that (the corporeality
of the gods involves) a contradiction to sacrifices; (we say) no,
because we find (in the scriptures) the assumption (by the gods) of many
(forms at one and the same time).
I.3.28 If it be said (that a contradiction
will result) in respect of the word (we say) no, because (the world)
originates from the word, as is known from direct perception (Sruti) and
I.3.29 From this very reason also there
follows the eternity of the Vedas.
I.3.30 And on account of the sameness of
names and forms in every fresh cycle there is no contradiction (to the
eternity of the words of the Vedas) even in the revolving of the world
cycles, as is seen from the Sruti and Smriti.
I.3.31 On account of the impossibility (of
the gods being qualified) for Madhu Vidya etc., Jaimini (is of opinion
that the gods) are not qualified (either for Upasana or for the Brahma
Vidya or the knowledge of the Self).
I.3.32 And (the gods are not qualified for
Vidyas) because (the words ‘sun, moon’ etc., spoken of as gods) are used
in the sense of mere spheres of light.
I.3.33 But Baadarayana, on the other hand
(maintains) the existence (of qualification on the part of the gods for
Brahma Vidya); for there are (passages indicatory of that; body, desires
etc., which qualify one for such knowledge do exist in the case of the
I.3.34 (King Janasruti) was in grief on
hearing some contemptuous words used about him by the sage in the form
of a swan; owing to his approaching Raikva, overwhelming with that
grief, Raikva called him Sudra; for it (the grief) is pointed at by
I.3.35 And because the Kshatriyahood (of
Janasruti) is known from the inferential mark (supplied by his being
mentioned) later on with Chaitraratha (who was a Kshatriya himself).
I.3.36 Because purificatory ceremonies are
mentioned (in the case of the twice-born) and their absence is declared
(in the case of the Sudra).
I.3.37 And because the inclination (on the
part of Gautama to impart knowledge is seen only) on the ascertainment
of the absence of Sudrahood (in Jabala Satyakama).
I.3.38 And on account of the prohibition in
Smriti of (the Sudras) hearing, studying and understanding (the Veda)
and performing Vedic rites (they are not entitled to the knowledge of
I.3.39 (Prana is Brahman) on account of the
vibration or trembling (spoken of the whole world).
I.3.40 The light (is Brahman) on account of
that (Brahman) being seen (in the scriptural passage).
I.3.41 Akasa (is Brahman) because it is
declared to be something different etc., (from names and forms).
I.3.42 Because of the Highest Self being
shown as different (from the individual soul) in the states of deep
sleep and death.
I.3.43 (The Being referred to in Sutra 42 is
Brahman) because of the words ‘Lord’ etc., being applied to Him. "He is
the controller, the Ruler, the Lord of all." Bri. Up. IV-4-22.
I.4.1 If it be said that in some (recensions
of the Vedas) that which is inferred (i.e. the Pradhana) (is) also
(mentioned), (we say) no, because (the word ‘Avyakta’ occurring in the
Katha Upanishad) is mentioned in a simile referred to the body (and
means the body itself and not the Pradhana of the (Sankhyas); (the
Sruti) also explains (it).
I.4.2 But the subtle (body is meant by the
term Avyakta) on account of its capability (of being so designated).
I.4.3 On account of its dependence (on the
Lord, such a previous seminal condition of the world may be admitted,
because such an admission is) reasonable.
I.4.4 And because it is not mentioned (that
the Avyakta) is to be known (it cannot be the Pradhana of the Sankhyas).
I.4.5 And if you maintain that the text does
speak (of the Pradhana as an object of knowledge) we deny that; because
the intelligent (supreme) Self is meant on account of the general
I.4.6 And there is question and explanation
relating to three things only (not to the Pradhana).
I.4.7 And (the case of the term Avyakta) is
like that of the term Mahat.
I.4.8 (It cannot be maintained that ‘Aja’
means the Pradhana) because no special characteristic is stated, as in
the case of the cup.
I.4.9 But (the elements) beginning with
light (are meant by the term Aja), because some read so in their text.
I.4.10 And on account of the statement of
the assumption (of a metaphor) there is nothing contrary to reason (in
Aja denoting the causal matter) as in the case of honey (denoting the
sun in Madhu Vidya for the sake of meditation) and similar cases.
I.4.11 Even from the statement of the number
(five-fold-five i.e., twenty-five categories by the Sruti it is) not (to
be understood that the Sruti refers to the Pradhana) on account of the
differences (in the categories and the excess over the number of the
I.4.12 (The Panchajanah or the five people
referred to are) the vital force etc., (as is seen) from the
I.4.13 In the text of some (the Kanva
recension) where food is not mentioned (the number five is made up) by
‘light’ (mentioned in the previous verse).
I.4.14 Although there is a conflict of the
Vedanta texts as regards the things created such as ether and so on,
there is no such conflict with respect to Brahman as the First Cause, on
account of His being represented in one text as described in other
I.4.15 (On account of the connection (with
passages treating of Brahman, non-existence does not mean absolute
I.4.16 (He whose work is this is Brahman)
because (the ‘work’) denotes the world.
I.4.17 If it be said that on account of the
inferential marks of the individual soul and the chief Prana (Brahman
is) not (referred to by the word ‘matter’ in the passage quoted), (we
reply) that has already been explained.
I.4.18 But Jaimini thinks that (the
reference to the individual soul in the text) has another purpose on
account of the question and the reply; moreover, thus some also (the
Vajasaneyins) (read in their text or recension).
I.4.19 (The Self to be seen, to be heard
etc., is the Supreme Self) on account of the connected meaning of the
I.4.20 (The fact that the individual soul is
taught as the object of realisation is an) indicatory mark which is
proof of the proposition; so Asmarathya thinks.
I.4.21 The initial statement identifies the
individual soul with Brahman or the Supreme Self because the soul, when
it will depart (from the body), is such (i.e. one with the Supreme
Self); thus Audulomi thinks.
I.4.22 (The initial statement is made)
because (the Supreme Self) exists in the condition (of the individual
soul); so the Sage Kasakritsna thinks.
I.4.23 (Brahman is) the material cause also
on account of (this view) not being in conflict with the proposition and
the illustrations (quoted in the Sruti).
I. 4.24 On account of the statement of will
or reflection (to create on the part of the Supreme Self, It is the
I.4.25 And because the Sruti states that
both (the origin and the dissolution of the universe) have Brahman for
their material cause.
I.4.26 (Brahman is the material cause of the
world) because it created Itself by undergoing modification.
I.4.27 And because (Brahman) is called the
I.4.28 By this all
(the doctrines concerning the origin of the world which are opposed to
the Vedanta texts) are explained.
II.1.1 If it be objected that (from the
doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world) there would result the
defect of there being no room for certain Smritis (we say) no, because
(by the rejection of that doctrine) there would result the defect of
want of room for some other Smriti.
II.1.2 And there being no mention (in the
scriptures) of others (i.e., the effects of the Pradhana according to
the Sankhya system), (the Sankhya system cannot be authoritative).
II.1.3 By this the
Yoga philosophy is (also) refuted.
II.1.4 (The objector says that) Brahman
cannot be the cause of the world, because this (the world) is of a
different nature (from Brahman) and its being so (different from
Brahman) (is known) from the scriptures.
II.1.5 But the reference is to the presiding
deities (of the organs) on account of the special characterisation and
also from the fact of a deity so presiding.
II.1.6 But it (such organisation of life
from matter) is also seen.
II.1.7 If it be said (that the world, the
effect, would then be) non-existent (before its origination or
creation), (we say) no, because it is a mere negation (without any
II.1.8 On account of the consequence that at
the time of Pralaya or great dissolution (the cause becomes) like that
(i.e., like the effect), the doctrine maintained hitherto (that Brahman
is the cause of the universe) is absurd.
II.1.9 But not (so) on account of the
existence of illustrations.
II.1.10 And because the objections (raised
by the Sankhya against the Vedanta doctrine) apply to his (Sankhya) view
II.1.11 If it be said that in consequence of
the non-finality of reasoning we must frame our conclusions otherwise;
(we reply that) thus also there would result non-release.
II.1.12 By this (i.e. by the arguments
against the Sankhyas) (those other theories) not accepted by the wise or
competent persons are explained or refuted.
II.1.13 If it be said (that if Brahman be
the cause then) on account of (the objects of enjoyment) turning into
the enjoyer, non-distinction (between the enjoyer and the objects
enjoyed) would result, we reply that such distinction may exist
nevertheless as is experienced commonly in the world.
II.1.14 The non-difference of them (i.e., of
cause and effect) results from such terms as ‘origin’ and the like.
II.1.15 And (because) only on the existence
(of the cause) (the effect) is experienced.
II.1.16 And on account of the posterior
(i.e., the effect which comes after the cause) existing (as the cause
II.1.17 If it be said that on account of
(the effect) being described as that which is not, (the effect does) not
(exist before creation), we reply ‘not so’, because the term ‘that which
is not’ denotes another characteristic or attribute (as is seen) from
the latter part of the text.
II.1.18 From reasoning and from another
Sruti text (the same is clear. This relation between cause and effect is
II.1.19 And like a piece of cloth.
II.1.20 And as in the case of the different
Pranas or Vital airs.
II.1.21 On account of the other (i.e., the
individual soul) being stated (as non-different from Brahman) there
would arise (in Brahman) the faults of not doing what is beneficial and
II.1.22 But (Brahman, the Creator, is)
something more (than the individual soul) on account of the statement in
the Srutis (of difference) between the individual soul (and Brahman).
II.1.23 And because the case is similar to
that of stones, etc., (produced from the same earth), the objection
raised is untenable.
II.1.24 If you object that Brahman without
instruments cannot be the cause of the universe, because an agent is
seen to collect materials for any construction, (we say) no, because (it
is) like milk (turning into curds).
II.1.25 (The case of Brahman creating the
world is) like that of gods and other beings in the world (in ordinary
II.1.26 Either the consequence of the entire
(Brahman undergoing change) has to be accepted, or else a violation of
the texts declaring Brahman to be without parts (if Brahman is the
material cause of the world).
II.1.27 But (this is not so) on account of
scriptural passages and on account of (Brahman) resting on scripture
II.1.28 And because in the individual soul
also (as in gods, magicians, in dreams) various (creation exists).
Similarly (with Brahman also).
II.1.29 And on account of the opponent’s own
view being subject to these very objections.
II.1.30 And (Brahman is) endowed with all
(powers), because it is seen (from the scriptures).
II.1.31 If it be said that because (Brahman)
is devoid of organs, (it is) not (able to create), (we reply that) this
has already been explained.
II.1.32 (Brahman is) not (the creator of the
universe) on account of (every activity) having a motive.
II.1.33 But (Brahman’s creative activity) is
mere sport, such as is seen in the world (or ordinary life).
II.1.34 Partiality and cruelty cannot (be
ascribed to Brahman) on account of His taking into consideration (other
reasons in that matter viz., merit and demerit of the souls), for so
II.1.35 If it be objected that it (viz., the
Lord’s having regard to merit and demerit) is not possible on account of
the non-distinction (of merit and demerit before creation), (we say) no,
because of (the world) being without a beginning.
II.1.36 And (that the world – and also Karma
– is without a beginning) is reasonable and is also seen (from the
II.1.37 And because all the qualities
(required for the creation of the world) are reasonably found (only in
Brahman) He must be admitted to be the cause of the universe.
II.2.1 That which is inferred, (by the
Sankhyas, viz., the Pradhana) cannot be the cause (of the world) because
(in that case it is) not possible (to account for the) design or orderly
arrangement (found in the creation).
II.2.2 And on account of the (impossibility
II.2.3 If it be said (that the Pradhana
moves or spontaneously modifies herself into the various products) like
milk or water (without the guidance of any intelligence), (we reply
that) there also (it is due to intelligence).
II.2.4 And because (the Pradhana) is not
dependent (on anything), there being no external agent besides it (it
cannot be active).
II.2.5 And (it can) not (be said that the
Pradhana modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, etc., (which turn
into milk), because of its absence elsewhere (than in the female
II.2.6 Even if we admit (the Sankhya
position with regard to the spontaneous modification of the Pradhana, it
cannot be the cause of the universe) because of the absence of any
II.2.7 If it be said (that the Purusha or
Soul can direct or move the Pradhana) as the (lame) man can direct a
blind man, or as the magnet (moves the iron), even then (the difficulty
cannot be overcome).
II.2.8 And again (the Pradhana cannot be
active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is
impossible (between the three Gunas).
II.2.9 Even if it be inferred otherwise on
account of the Pradhana being devoid of the power of intelligence (the
other objections to the Pradhana being the cause of the universe remain
II.2.10 And moreover (the Sankhya doctrine)
is objectionable on account of its contradictions.
II.2.11 (The world may originate from
Brahman) as the great and the long originate from the short and the
II.2.12 In both cases also (in the cases of
the Adrishta, the unseen principle inhering either in the atoms or the
soul) the activity (of the atoms) is not possible; hence negation of
that (viz., creation through the union of the atoms).
II.2.13 And because in consequence of
Samavaya being admitted, a regresssus ad infinitum results on similar
reasoning (hence the Vaiseshika theory is untenable).
II.2.14 And on account of the permanent
existence (of activity or non-activity, the atomic theory is not
II.2.15 And on account of the atoms
possessing colour, etc., the opposite (of which the Vaiseshikas hold
would take place), because it is seen or observed.
II.2.16 And because of defects in both cases
(the atomic theory cannot be accepted).
II.2.17 And because (the atomic theory) is
not accepted (by authoritative sages like Manu and others) it is to be
II.2.18 Even if the (two kinds of)
aggregates proceed from their two causes, there would take place
non-establishment (of the two aggregates).
II.2.19 If it be said that (the formation of
aggregates may be explained) through (nescience) standing in the
relation of mutual causality, we say ‘no’; they merely are the efficient
cause of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links and not of the
II.2.20 (Nor can there be a causal relation
between nescience, etc.) because on the origination of the subsequent
thing the preceding one ceases to be.
II.2.21 If non-existence (of cause) be
assumed, (while yet the effect takes place), there results contradiction
of the admitted principle or proposition. Otherwise there would result
simultaneity (of cause and effect).
II.2.22 Conscious and unconscious
destruction would be impossible on account of non-interruption.
II.2.23 And on account of the objections
presenting themselves in either case.
II.2.24 The cause of Akasa (ether) also not
being different (from the two other kinds of destruction it also cannot
be a non-entity.)
II.2.25 And on account of memory the things
are not momentary.
II.2.26(Existence or entity does) not
(spring) from non-existence or non-entity, because it is not seen.
II.2.27 And thus (if existence should spring
from non-existence, there would result) the attainment of the goal by
the indifferent and non-active people also.
II.2.28 The non-existence (of eternal
things) cannot be maintained; on account of (our) consciousness (of
II.2.29 And on account of the difference in
nature (in consciousness between the waking and the dreaming state, the
experience of the waking state) is not like dreams, etc., etc.
II.2.30 The existence (of Samskaras or
mental impressions) is not possible (according to the Bauddhas), on
account of the absence of perception (of external things).
II.2.31 And on account of the momentariness
(of the Alayavijnana or ego-consciousness it cannot be the abode of the
Samskaras or mental impressions).
II.2.32 And (as the Bauddha system is)
illogical in every way (it cannot be accepted).
II.2.33 On account of the impossibility (of
contradictory attributes) in one and the same thing at the same time
(the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).
II.2.34 And in the same way (there results
from the Jaina doctrine) the non-universality of the soul.
II.2.35 Nor is non-contradiction to be
derived from the succession (of parts according to and departing from
the soul to such different bodies) on account of the change, etc., (of
II.2.36 And on
account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul on release) and
the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes), there is no
difference (of size of the soul, at any time).
II.2.37 The Lord (cannot be the efficient or
the operative cause of the world) on account of the inconsistency (of
II.2.38 And because relation (between the
Lord and the Pradhana or the souls) is not possible.
II.2.39 And on account of the impossibility
of rulership (on the part of the Lord).
II.2.40 If it be said (that the Lord rules
the Pradhana etc.,) just as (the Jiva rules) the senses (which are also
not perceived), (we say) no, because of the enjoyment, etc.
II.2.41 (There would follow from their
doctrine the Lord’s) being subject to destruction or His
II.2.42 On account of the impossibility of
the origination (of the individual soul from the Highest Lord), (the
doctrine of the Bhagavatas or the Pancharatra doctrine cannot be
II.2.43 And (it is) not (observed that) the
instrument (is produced) from the agent.
II.2.44 Or if the (four Vyuhas are said to)
possess infinite knowledge, etc., yet there is no denial of that (viz.,
the objection raised in Sutra 42).
II.2.45 And because of contradictions (the
Pancharatra doctrine is untenable).
II.3.1 (The Purvapakshin, i.e., the objector
says that) ether (Akasa) (does) not (originate), as Sruti does not say
II.3.2 But there is (a Sruti text which
states that Akasa is created).
II.3.3 (The Sruti text concerning the
origination of Akasa) has a secondary sense, on account of the
impossibility (of the origination of the Akasa).
II.3.4 Also from the Sruti texts (we find
that Akasa is eternal).
II.3.5 It is possible that the one word
(‘sprang’ – Sambhutah) may be used in a secondary and primary sense like
the word Brahman.
II.3.6 The non-abandonment of the
proposition (viz., by the knowledge of one everything else becomes
known, can result only) from the non-difference (of the entire world
from Brahman) according to the words of the Veda or the Sruti texts
(which declare the non-difference of the cause and its effects).
II.3.7 But wherever there are effects, there
are separateness as is seen in the world (as in ordinary life).
II.3.8 By this i.e., the foregoing
explanation about Akasa being a product, (the fact of) air (also being
an effect) is explained.
II.3.9 But there is no origin of that which
is (i.e., Brahman), on account of the impossibility (of such an origin).
II.3.10 Fire (is produced) from this (i.e.,
air), so verily (declares the Sruti).
II.3.11 Water (is produced from fire).
II.3.12 The earth (is meant by the word
‘Anna’) because of the subject matter, colour and other Sruti texts.
II.3.13 But on account of the indicating
mark supplied by their reflecting, i.e., by the reflection attributed to
the elements, He (i.e., the Lord is the creative principle abiding
within the elements).
II.3.14 The order (in which the elements are
indeed withdrawn into Brahman during Pralaya or dissolution) is the
reverse of that (i.e., the order in which they are created) and this is
II.3.15 If it be said that between (Brahman
and the elements) the intellect and the mind (are mentioned, and that
therefore their origination and re-absorption are to be placed)
somewhere in the series on account of their being inferential signs
(whereby the order of the creation of the elements is broken), we say,
not so on account of the non-difference (of the intellect and the mind
from the elements).
II.3.16 But the mention of that (viz., birth
and death of the individual soul) is apt only with reference to the
bodies of beings moving and non-moving. It is secondary or metaphorical
if applied to the soul, as the existence of those terms depends on the
existence of that (i.e., the body).
II.3.17 The individual soul is not
(produced), (because) it is not (so) mentioned by the scriptures, and as
it is eternal according to them (the Sruti texts).
II.3 18 For this very reason (viz., that it
is not created), (the individual soul is) intelligence (itself).
II.3.19 (On account of the scriptural
declarations) of (the soul’s) passing out, going, and returning (the
soul is not infinite in size; it is of atomic size).
II.3.20 And on account of the latter two
(i.e., going and returning) being connected with their soul (i.e.,
agent), (the soul is of atomic size).
II.3.21 If it be said that (the soul is) not
atomic, as the scriptures state it to be otherwise, (i.e.,
all-pervading), (we say) not so, because (the one) other than the
individual soul (i.e., the Supreme Brahman or the Highest Self) is the
subject matter (of those passages).
II.3.22 And on account of direct statements
(of the Sruti texts as to the atomic size) and infinitesimal measure
(the soul is atomic).
II.3.23 There is no contradiction as in the
case of sandal paste.
II.3.24 If it be said (that the two cases
are not parallel), on account of the specialisation of abode (present in
the case of the sandal-ointment, absent in the case of the soul), we
deny that, on account of the acknowledgement (by scripture, of a special
place of the soul), viz., within the heart.
II.3.25 Or on account of (its) quality
(viz., intelligence), as in cases of ordinary experience (such as in the
case of a lamp by its light).
II.3.26 The extension (of the quality of
intelligence) beyond (the soul in which it inheres) is like the odour
(which extends beyond the fragrant object).
II.3.27 Thus also, (the Sruti) shows or
II.3.28 On account of the separate teaching
(of the Sruti) (that the soul pervades the body on account of its
quality of intelligence).
II.3.29 But that declaration (as to the
atomic size of the soul) is on account of its having for its essence the
qualities of that (viz., the Buddhi), as in the case of the intelligent
Lord (Saguna Brahman).
II.3.30 And there is no defect or fault in
what has been said in the previous Sutra (as the conjunction of the soul
with the intellect exists) so long as the soul (in its relative aspect)
exists; because it is so seen (in the scriptures).
II.3.31 On account of the appropriateness of
the manifestation of that (connection) which exists (potentially) like
virile power, etc.
II.3.32 Otherwise (if no intellect existed)
there would result either constant perception or constant
non-perception, or else a limitation of either of the two (i.e., of the
soul or of the senses).
II.3.33 (The soul is) an agent on account of
the scripture having a purport thereby.
II.3.34 And on account of (the Sruti)
teaching (its) wandering about.
II.3.35 (Also it is a doer) on account of
its taking the organs.
II.3.36 (The soul is an agent) also because
it is designated as such with regard to actions; if it were not so,
there would be a change of designation.
II.3.37 As in the case of perception (there
is) no rule (here also).
II.3.38 On account of the reversal of power
(of the Buddhi).
II.3.39 And on the account of the
impossibility of Samadhi.
II.3.40 And as the carpenter is both.
II.3.41 But (even)
that (agency of the soul) is from the Supreme Lord, so declares the
II.3.42 But (the Lord’s making the soul act)
depends on the works done (by it), for otherwise there will be
uselessness of the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions.
II.3.43 (The soul is) a part of the Lord on
account of difference (between the two) being declared and otherwise
also (i.e., as non-different from Brahman); because in some (Vedic
texts) (Brahman) is spoken of as being fishermen, knaves, etc.
II.3.44 Also from the words of the Mantra
(it is known that the soul is a part of the Lord).
II.3.45 And it is so stated in the Smriti.
II.3.46 The Supreme Lord is not (affected by
pleasure and pain) like this (individual soul) just as light (is
unaffected by the shaking of its reflections).
II.3.47 The Smritis also state (that).
II.3.48 Injunctions and prohibitions (are
possible) on account of the connection (of the Self) with the body, as
in the case of light, etc.
II.3.49 And on account of the non-extension
(of the soul beyond its own body) there is no confusion (of results of
II.3.50 And (the individual soul is) only a
reflection (of Paramatman or the Supreme Lord).
II.3.51 There being no fixity about the
unseen principle (there would result confusion of works and their
effects for those who believe in many souls, each all-pervading).
II.3.52 And this is also the case in
II.3.53 If it be said (that the distinction
of pleasure and pain etc., results) from (the difference of) place, (we
say) not so, on account of the self being in all bodies.
II.4.1 Thus the vital airs (are produced
II.4.2 On account of the impossibility of a
secondary (origin of the Pranas).
II.4.3 On account of that (word which
indicates origin) being mentioned first (in connection with Pranas).
II.4.4 Because speech is preceded by that,
(viz., fire and the other elements).
II.4.5 The Pranas (organs) are seven on
account of this being understood (from scriptural passages) and of the
specification (of those seven).
II.4.6 But (there are also in addition to
the seven Pranas mentioned) the hands and rest. This being a settled
matter, therefore (we must) not (conclude) thus (viz., that there are
seven Pranas only).
II.4.7 And (they are) minute.
II.4.8 And the best (i.e., the chief vital
air or Prana is also produced).
II.4.9 (The chief Prana is) neither air nor
function, on account of its being mentioned separately.
II.4.10 But (the Prana is subordinate to the
soul), like eyes, etc., on account of (its) being taught with them (the
eyes, etc.) and for other reasons.
II.4.11 And on account of (its) not being an
instrument the objection is not (valid); because thus (scripture)
II.4.12 It is taught as having a fivefold
function like the mind.
II.4.13 And it (chief Prana) is minute.
II.4.14 But there is the presiding over by
Fire and others (over the organs), because of such statement in Sruti.
II.4.15 (The gods are not the enjoyers, but
the soul, because the organs are connected) with the one (i.e., the
soul) possessing them (a thing we know) from the scriptures.
II.4.16 And on account of its (soul’s)
permanence (in the body it is the enjoyer, and not the gods).
II.4.17 They (the other Pranas) are senses,
on account of being so designated (by the scriptures), with the
exception of the best (the chief Prana).
II.4.18 (On account of the) scriptural
statement of difference.
II. 4.19 And on account of the difference of
II.4.20 But the creation of names and forms
is by Him who does the tripartite (creation), for so the scriptures
II.4.21 Flesh, etc.,
originates from earth according to the scriptural statement and (so
also) in the case of the other (elements, viz., fire and water).
II.4.22 But on account of the preponderance
(of a particular element in them the gross elements) are so named (after
CHAPTER III: SADHANA (Spiritual practice)
III.1.1 In order to obtain another body (the
soul) goes enveloped (by subtle elements) (as appears from) the question
and explanation (in the scripture, Chhandogya).
III.1.2 On account of water consisting of
three (elements) (the soul is enveloped by all these elements and not
merely water); but (water alone is mentioned in the text) on account of
its preponderance (in the human body).
III.1.3 And because of the going out of the
Pranas (the sense organs) with the soul, the elements also accompany the
III.1.4 If it be said (that the Pranas or
the organs do not follow the soul) on account of the scriptural
statements as to entering into Agni, etc., (we say) not so, on account
of its being so said in a secondary sense (or metaphorical nature of
III.1.5 If it be objected on the ground of
water not being mentioned in the first of the oblations, we say not so,
because that (water) only is verily meant by the word "Sraddha" because
that is the most appropriate meaning of the word in that passage.
III.1.6 If it be said that on account of
(the soul) not being stated in the Sruti (the soul does not depart
enveloped by water, etc.) (we say) not so, because it is understood
(from the scriptures) that the Jivas who perform sacrifices and other
good works (alone go to heaven).
III.1.7 But (the souls’ being the food of
the gods in heaven is used) in a secondary or metaphorical sense, on
account of their not knowing the Self because the Sruti declares like
III.1.8 On the exhaustion of good work the
soul returns to the earth with a remainder of the Karmas, as can be
understood from direct statement in Sruti and Smriti, by the same route
through which he ascended after death and differently too.
III.1.9 If it be
objected that on account of conduct (the assumption of the remnant of
Karma, Anusaya is not necessary for rebirth on earth), (we say) not so
(because the word ‘conduct’ is used) to signify indirectly (the
remainder). So Karshnajini thinks.
III.1.10 If it be said (by such
interpretation of the word ‘conduct’ – good conduct would become)
purposeless, (we say) not so, on account of (Karma) being dependent on
that (good conduct).
III.1.11 But conduct (Charana) means merely
good and evil works; thus the sage Baadari thinks.
III.1.12 The Sruti declares that the
non-performers of sacrifices, etc., also (go to the world of moon).
III.1.13 But of others, (i.e., those who
have not performed sacrifices, etc.) the ascent is to the abode of Yama
and after having experienced (the results of their evil deeds) they come
down to the earth; as such a course is declared by the Sruti.
III.1.14 The Smritis also declare thus.
III.1.15 Moreover there are seven (hells).
III.1.16 And on account of his (Yama’s)
control even there (in those hells) is no contradiction.
III.1.17 But (the reference is to the two
roads) of knowledge and work, those two being under discussion.
III.1.18 Not in (the case of) a third place,
as it is thus declared in the scriptures.
III.1.19 And (moreover the) Smritis have
recorded also (that) in this world (there had been cases of birth
without the course of five oblations).
III.1.20 Also on account of observation.
III.1.21 The third term (i.e. plant life)
includes that which springs from heat and moisture.
III.1.22 (The soul when coming down from the
sphere of moon) attains similarity of nature with them, (i.e., with
ether, air, etc.,) as this only is possible.
III.1.23 (The soul passes through the stages
of its descent) in a not very long time; on account of the special
III.1.24 (The descending soul enters) into
(plants) animated other (souls), as in the previous cases, on account of
III.1.25 If it be said that (sacrificial
work is) unholy, (we say) not so, on account of scriptural authority.
III.1.26 Then (the soul gets) connected with
him who performs the act of generation.
III.1.27 From the womb a (new) body
III.2.1 In the intermediate stage (between
waking and deep sleep) there is (a real) creation; because (the Sruti)
III.2.2 And some (the followers of one
Sakha, namely, the Kathakas) (state that the Supreme Lord is the)
Creator; sons, etc., (being the lovely things which He creates).
III.2.3 But it (viz., the dream world) is
mere illusion on account of its nature not manifesting itself with the
totality (of the attributes of reality).
III.2.4 But (though the dream world is an
illusion), yet it is indicative (of the future), for (so we find) in the
Sruti, the dream experts also declare this.
III.2.5 But by the meditation on the Supreme
Lord, that which is hidden (by ignorance, viz., the equality of the Lord
and the soul becomes manifest), because from him (the Lord) are its (the
soul’s) bondage and freedom.
III.2.6 And that (viz., the concealment of
the soul’s rulership) also (results) from its connection with the body.
III.2.7 The absence of that (i.e., of
dreams, i.e., dreamless sleep) takes place in the nerves (Nadis or
psychic currents) and in the self, as it is known from the Sruti or
III.2.8 Hence the waking from that (viz.,
III.2.9 But the same (soul returns from
Brahman after deep sleep) on account of work, remembrance, scriptural
text and precept.
III.2.10 In a swoon (in him who is
senseless) there is half union on account of this remaining (as the only
alternative left, as the only possible hypothesis).
III.2.11 Not on account of (difference of)
place also two-fold characteristics can belong to the Highest; for
everywhere (scripture teaches It to be without any difference).
III.2.12 If it be said that it is not so on
account of difference (being taught in the scriptures), we reply that it
is not so, because with reference to each (such form), the Sruti
declares the opposite of that.
III.2.13 Moreover some (teach) thus.
III.2.14 Verily Brahman is only formless on
account of that being the main purport (of all texts about Brahman).
III.2.15 And as light (assumes forms as it
were by its contact with things possessing form, so does Brahman take
form in connection with Upadhis or limiting adjuncts), because (texts
which ascribe form to Brahman) are not meaningless.
III.2.16 And (the Sruti) declares (that
Brahman is) that (i.e., intelligence) only.
III.2.17(The scripture) also shows (this
and) it is likewise stated in Smriti.
III.2.18 For this very reason (we have with
respect to Brahman) comparisons like the images of the sun and the like.
III.2.19 But there is no similarity (of the
two things compared since) (in the case of Brahman any second thing) is
not apprehended or experienced like water.
III.2.20 As (the highest Brahman) is inside
(its limiting adjuncts) It participates in their increase and decrease;
owing to the appropriateness (thus resulting) of the two (things
compared), it is thus, (i.e., the comparison holds good).
III.2.21 And on
account of the declaration of scripture.
III.2.22 What has been mentioned up to this
is denied (by the words "not this, not this" and the Sruti) says
something more than that (afterwards).
III.2.23 That (Brahman) is not manifest, for
(so the scripture) says.
III.2.24 And moreover (Brahman is
experienced) in devout meditation (as we know) from the Sruti and
III.2.25 And as in the case of (physical)
light and the like, there is no difference, so also between Brahman and
Its manifestation in activity; on account of the repeated instruction
(of the Sruti to that effect).
III.2.26 Therefore (the individual soul
becomes one) with the Infinite; for thus the (scripture) indicates.
III.2.27 But on account of both (i.e.,
difference and non-difference) being taught (by the Sruti), (the
relation of the highest Brahman to the individual soul has to be viewed)
like that of the snake to its coils.
III.2.28 Or like (the relation of) light and
its substratum, on account of both being luminous.
III.2.29 Or (the relation between the two,
i.e., Jiva and Brahman is) as (given) before.
III.2.30 And on account of the denial.
III.2.31 (There is something) Superior to
this (Brahman) on account of terms denoting a bank, measure, connection
and difference (used with respect to It).
III.2.32 But (Brahman is called a bank etc.)
on account of similarity.
III.2.33 (The statement as to Brahman having
size) is for the sake of easy comprehension (i.e., Upasana or devout
meditation); just like (four) feet.
III.2.34 (The statements concerning
connection and difference with respect to Brahman) are due to special
places: as in the case of light and the like.
III.2.35 And it is reasonable.
III.2.36 Similarly on account of the express
denial of all other things (there is nothing but Brahman).
III.2.37 By this the Omnipresence (of
Brahman is established) in accordance with the scriptural statements
regarding (Brahman’s) extent.
III.2.38 From Him (the Lord) are the fruits
of actions, for that is reasonable.
III.2.39 And because the Sruti so teaches.
III.2.40 Jaimini thinks for the same reasons
(viz., scriptural authority and reasoning, on the same ground as stated
in Sutras 38 and 39) that religious merit (is what brings about the
fruits of actions).
III.2.41 But Baadarayana thinks the former
(i.e., the Lord to be the cause of the fruits of action) on account of
His being declared to be the cause (of the actions themselves).
III.3.1 (The Vidyas
or the Upasanas) described in the various Vedanta texts (are not
different, are identical) on account of the non-difference of
injunction, etc., (i.e., connection, form and name).
III.3.2 If it be said that the Vidyas are
separate on account of difference (in minor points), we deny that, since
even in the same Vidyas (there may be such minor differences).
III.3.3 (The rite of carrying fire on the
head is connected) with the study of the Veda (of the Atharvanikas),
because in the Samachara (it is mentioned) as being such. And (this also
follows) from its being a qualification (for the students of the Atharva
Veda) as in the case with the (seven) oblations (viz., Saurya etc.).
III.3.4 (The scripture) also instructs
III.3.5 And in the Upasanas of the same
class (mentioned in different Sakhas) a combination (of all the
particulars mentioned in all Sakhas is to be made) as there is no
difference in the object of meditation, just as (a combination of) all
subsidiary rites of a main sacrifice (mentioned in different Sakhas is
III.3.6 If it be said (that the Udgitha
Vidya of the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad and that of the Chhandogya
Upanishad) are different on account of (difference in) texts; we deny
this on the ground of their non-difference (as regards essentials).
III.3.7 Or rather there is no (unity of the
Vidyas) owing to the difference of subject matter even as (the
meditation on the Udgitha) as the highest and greatest (i.e., Brahman)
(is different from the meditation on the Udgitha as abiding in the eye
III.3.8 If it be said (that the Vidyas are
one) on account of (the identity of) name; (we reply that) that is
explained (already); moreover that (identity of name) is (found in the
case of admittedly separate Vidyas).
III.3.9 And because (OM) extends (over the
whole of the Vedas), (to specialise it by the term ‘Udgitha’) is
III.3.10 On account of the non-difference
(of the Vidya) everywhere (i.e., in all the texts of the different
Sakhas where the Prana-Vidya occurs) these qualities (mentioned in two
of them are to be inserted) in the other places (e.g., the Kaushitaki
III.3.11 Bliss and other attributes (which
depict the true nature) of the Principal or the Supreme Self, i.e.,
Brahman (have to be combined from all places in the meditation on
III.3.12 (Qualities like) joy being His
head, etc., are not to be taken everywhere, (being subject to) increase
and decrease (are possible only) if there is difference (and not in
Brahman in which there is non-difference).
III.3.13 But other attributes (like Bliss,
etc., are to be combined) on account of identity of purport.
III.3.14 (The passage in Katha Upanishad
I.3.10 tells about the Self only as the highest) for the sake of pious
meditation, as there is no use (of the knowledge of the objects being
higher than the senses and so on).
III.3.15 And on account of the word Atman.
III.3.16 (In the Aitareya Upanishad I.1.)
the Supreme Self is meant, as in other texts (dealing with creation)
because of the subsequent qualification.
III.3.17 (If it be said that because of the
context (the Supreme Self is not meant) (we reply that) it is so (i.e.,
the Supreme Self is meant) on account of the definite statement (that
the Atman alone existed in the beginning).
III.3.18 (On account of (the rinsing of the
mouth with water referred to in the Prana Vidya) being a reiteration of
an act (already ordained by the Smriti), what has not been so ordained
elsewhere (is here enjoined by the Sruti).
III.3.19 (In the same (Sakha also) it is
thus (i.e., there is unity of Vidya,) owing to non-difference (of the
object of meditation).
III.3.20 Thus in other cases also, on
account of the connection (of particulars with one and the same Vidya).
III.3.21 Rather not (so) on account of the
difference (of place).
III.3.22 (The scripture) also declares
III.3.23 For the same reason (as in the
previous Sutra) the supporting (of the world) and pervading the sky
(attributed to Brahman in the Ranayaniya Khila) also (are not to be
included in other Vidyas or Upasanas of Brahman).
III.3.24 (And (as the qualities) as
(mentioned) in the Purusha-Vidya (of the Chhandogya) are not mentioned
(in that) of the others (i.e., in the Taittiriya) (the two
Purusha-Vidyas are not one; are not to be combined).
III.3.25 Because the matter (of certain
Mantras) such as piercing and so on is different (from the matter of the
approximate Vidyas), (the former are not to be combined with the
III.3.26 But where only the getting rid (of
the good and evil) is mentioned (the obtaining of this good and evil by
others has to be added) because the statement about acceptance is
supplementary (to the statement about the getting rid of) as in the case
of the Kusas, metres, praise and hymns or recitations. This (i.e., the
reason for this) has been stated (by Jaimini in Purvamimamsa).
III.3.27 (He who attains knowledge gets rid
of his good and evil deeds) at the time of death, there being nothing to
be attained (by him on the way to Brahmaloka through those works); for
thus others (declare in their sacred texts).
III.3.28 (The interpretation that the
individual soul practising Yama-Niyama) according to his liking
(discards good and evil works while living is reasonable) on account of
there being harmony in that case between the two (viz., cause and
effect, as well as between the Chhandogya and another Sruti).
III.3.29 (The soul’s) journey (along the
path of the gods, Devayana) is applicable in a two-fold manner,
otherwise there would be contradiction (of scripture).
III.3.30 (The two-fold view taken above) is
justified because we observe a purpose characterised thereby (i.e., a
purpose of the going) as in ordinary life.
III.3.31 There is no restriction (as to the
going on the path of the gods for any Vidya). There is no contradiction
as is seen from the Sruti and Smriti.
III.3.32 Of those who have a mission to
fulfil (there is corporeal) existence, so long as the mission is not
III.3.33 But the conceptions of the
(negative) attributes of the Imperishable (Brahman) are to be combined
(from different texts where the Imperishable Brahman is dealt with, as
they form one Vidya), because of the similarity (of defining the
Imperishable Brahman through denials) and the object (the Imperishable
Brahman) being the same, as in the case of the Upasad (offerings). This
has been explained (by Jaimini in the Purvamimamsa).
III.3 34 Because (the same thing) is
described as such and such.
III.3.35 As the Self is within all, as in
the case of the aggregate of the elements, (there is oneness of Vidya).
III.3.36 If it be said (that the two Vidyas
are separate, for) otherwise the repetition cannot be accounted for, we
reply not so; (it is) like (the repetition) in another instruction (in
III.3.37 There is exchange (of meditation),
because the texts distinguish (two meditations); as in other cases.
III.3.38 The same (Satya Vidya is taught in
both places), because (attributes like) Satya etc., (are seen in both
III.3.39 (Qualities like true) desire etc.,
(mentioned in the Chhandogya Upanishad are to be inserted) in the other
(i.e., in the Brihadaranyaka) and (those mentioned) in the other (i.e.,
in the Brihadaranyaka are also to be inserted in the Chhandogya) on
account of the abode, etc., (being the same in both).
III.3.40 On account of the respect shown (to
the Pranagnihotra by the Sruti) there can be no omission (of this act)
(even when the eating of food is omitted).
III.3.41 When eating is taking place (the
Pranagnihotra has to be performed) from that (i.e., the food first
eaten), for so (the Sruti) declares.
III.3.42 There is no
rule about the inviolability of that (i.e., Upasanas connected with
certain sacrifices) that is seen (from the Sruti itself); for a separate
fruit (belongs to the Upasanas), viz., non-obstruction (of the results
of the sacrifice).
III.3.43 As in the case of the offerings
(Vayu and Prana must be held apart). This has been explained (in the
III.3.44 On account of the majority of
indicatory marks (the fires of the mind, speech, etc., in the
Agnirahasya of the Vajasaneyins do not form part of the sacrifice), for
it (the indicatory mark) is stronger (than the context or the general
subject matter). This also (has been explained in the Purvamimamsa
Sutras by Jaimini).
III.3.45 (The fires spoken of in the
previous Sutra are) alternative forms of the one mentioned first, (i.e.,
the actual sacrificial fire) on account of the context; (they) ought to
be part of the sacrifice like the imaginary drink or the Manasa-cup.
III.3.46 And on account of the extension (of
the attributes of the actual fire to these imaginary fires).
III.3.47 But (the fires) rather constitute
the Vidya, because (the Sruti) asserts it.
III.3 48 And because (in the text indicatory
marks of that are) seen.
III.3.49 (The view that the Agnis or fires
constitute an independent Vidya) cannot be refuted, owing to the greater
force of the Sruti etc.
III.3.50 On account of the connection and so
on (the fires built of mind, etc., form an independent Vidya), in the
same way as other Vidyas (like Sandilya Vidya) are separate; and it is
seen (that in spite of the context a sacrifice is treated as
independent). This has been explained (in the Purvamimamsa Sutras by
III.3.51 In spite of the resemblance (of the
fires to the imaginary drink, they do) not (constitute part of the
sacrificial act) because it is seen (from the reasons given, and on the
ground of Sruti that they form an independent Vidya) as in the case of
death; for the world does not become (fire, because it resembles fire in
III.3.52 And from the subsequent (Brahmana)
the fact of the text (under discussion) being such (i.e., enjoining an
independent Vidya) (is known). But the connection (of the fanciful Agnis
or imaginary fires with the actual fire is) on account of the abundance
(of the attributes of the latter that are imagined in these fires).
III.3.53 (Some (maintain the non-existence)
of a separate self (besides the body) on account of the existence (of
the self) where a body is (only).
III.3.54 But not (so); a self or soul
separate (from the body does exist), because (Consciousness) does not
exist even when there is the body (after death), as in the case of
cognition or perceptive consciousness.
III.3.55 But (the Upasanas or meditations
connected with parts) (of sacrificial acts are) not (restricted) to
(particular) Sakhas, according to the Veda (to which they belong), (but
to all its Sakhas because the same Upasana is described in all).
III.3.56 Or else, there is no contradiction
(here), as in the case of Mantras and the like.
III.3.57 Importance (is given to the
meditation) on the entire form (of Vaisvanara) as in the case of
sacrifice; for thus (the Sruti) shows.
III.3.58 (The Vidyas are) separate, on
account of the difference of words and the like.
III.3.59 There is option (with respect to
the several Vidyas), because the result (of all the Vidyas) is the same.
III.3.60 But Vidyas for particular desires
may be combined or not according to one’s desires on account of the
absence of the previous reason (mentioned in the previous Sutra).
III.3.61 With regard (to meditations)
connected with members (of sacrificial acts) it is as with (the members)
with which they are connected.
III.3.62 And from the injunction of the
III.3.63 On account of the rectification.
III.3.64 And from the Sruti declaring ‘OM’
which is a common feature (of the Udgitha Vidya) to be common to all the
III.3.65 (The meditations connected with
members of the sacrificial acts are) rather not (to be combined) as the
Sruti does not state their going together.
III.3.66 And because the Sruti (scripture)
says so (shows it).
III.4.1 From this (Brahma Vidya or Brahma
Jnana results) the purpose or the chief object of pursuit of man,
because the scriptures state so; thus (holds) the sage Baadarayana.
III.4.2 Because (the self) is supplementary
(to sacrificial acts), (the fruits of the Knowledge of the Self) are
mere praise of the agent, as in other cases; thus Jaimini opines.
III.4.3 Because we find (from the scriptures
such) conduct (of men of realisation).
III.4.4 Because scripture directly declares
that (viz., that knowledge of Brahman stands in a subordinate relation
to sacrificial acts.)
III.4.5 Because the two (knowledge and work)
go together (with the departing soul to give fruits of actions).
III.4.6 Because (the scriptures) enjoin
(works) for such (only who understand the purport of the Vedas).
III.4.7 And on account of prescribed rules.
III.4.8 But because (the scriptures) teach
(the Supreme Self to be) other (than the agent), Baadarayana’s view is
correct (or valid) for that is seen thus (in scriptural passages).
III.4.9 But the declarations of the Sruti
equally support both views.
III.4.10 (The scriptural declaration
referred to in Sutra 4) is not of universal application.
III.4.11 There is division of knowledge and
work as in the case of a hundred (divided between two persons).
III.4.12 (The scriptures enjoin work) on
those who have merely read the Vedas.
III.4.13 There being no specification (the
rule does) not (specially apply to him who knows, i. e., a Jnani).
III.4.14 Or rather the permission (to do
work) is for the glorification (of knowledge).
III.4.15 And some according to their own
liking (have abandoned all works).
III.4.16 And (scripture teaches that the)
destruction (of all qualifications for work results from knowledge).
III.4.17 And (knowledge belongs) to those
who observe perpetual celibacy, because in scripture (that stage of life
III.4.18 Jaimini (considers that scriptural
texts mentioning those stages of life in which celibacy is obligatory,
contain) a reference (only to those stages; they are not injunctions;
because other (scriptural texts) condemn (those stages).
III.4.19 Baadarayana (holds that Sannyasa)
also must be gone through, because the scriptural text (quoted) refers
equally to all the four Asramas or stages of life.
III.4.20 Or rather (there is an) injunction
(in this text) as in the case of carrying (of the sacrificial wood).
III.4.21 If it be said that (texts such as
the one about the Udgitha are) mere glorifications on account of their
reference (to parts of sacrifices), (we say) not so, on account of the
newness (of what they teach, if viewed as injunctions).
III.4.22 And there being words expressive of
III.4.23 If it be said (that the stories
told in the Upanishads) are for the purpose of Pariplava (only, we say)
not so, because (certain stories above) are specified (by the Sruti for
III.4.24 And so (they are meant to
illustrate the nearest Vidyas), being connected as one coherent whole.
III.4.25 And, therefore, there is no
necessity of the lighting of the fire and so on.
III.4.26 And there is the necessity of all
works because the scriptures prescribe sacrifices, etc., (as means to
the attainment of knowledge) even as the horse (is used to draw a
chariot, and not for ploughing).
III.4.27 But all the same (even though there
is no injunction to do sacrificial acts to attain knowledge in the
Brihadaranyaka text) one must possess serenity, self-control and the
like, as these are enjoined as auxiliaries to knowledge and therefore
have necessarily to be practised.
III.4.28 Only when life is in danger (there
is) permission to take all food (i.e., take food indiscriminately)
because the Sruti declares that.
III.4.29 And because (thus) (the scriptural
statements with respect to food) are not contradicted.
III.4.30 And moreover the Smritis say so.
III.4.31 And hence the scripture prohibiting
III.4.32 And the duties of the Asramas (are
to be performed also by him who does not desire emancipation) because
they are enjoined (on him by the scriptures).
III.4.33 And (the duties are to be performed
also) as a means to knowledge.
III.4.34 In all cases the same duties (have
to be performed), because of the twofold indicatory marks.
III.4.35 And the scripture also declares
(that he who is endowed with Brahmacharya) is not overpowered (by
passion, anger, etc.).
III.4.36 And (persons standing) in between
(two Asramas) are also (qualified for knowledge), for that is seen (in
III.4.37 This is stated in Smriti also.
III.4.38 And the promotion (of knowledge is
bestowed on them) through special acts.
III.4.39 Better than this is the other
(state of belonging to an Asrama) on account of the indicatory marks (in
the Sruti and the Smriti).
III.4.40 But for one who has become that
(i.e. entered the highest Asrama, i.e., Sannyasa) there is no reverting
(to the preceding ones) on account of restrictions prohibiting such
reversion or descending to a lower order. Jaimini also (is of this
III.4.41 And there is no fitness for
expiation in the case of a Naishthika Brahmacharin (who is immoral),
because a fall (in his case) is inferred from the Smriti and because of
the inefficacy (in his case) of the expiatory ceremony.
III.4.42 But some (consider the sin) a minor
one (and therefore claim) the existence (of expiation for the Naishthika
Brahmacharin also); as in the case of eating (of unlawful food). This
has been explained (in the Purvamimamsa).
III.4.43 But (they are to be kept) outside
the society in either case, on account of the Smriti and custom.
III.4.44 To the sacrificer (belongs the
agentship in meditations) because the Sruti declares a fruit (for it):
thus Atreya (holds).
III.4.45 (They are)
the duty of the Ritvik (priest), this is the view of Audulomi, because
he is paid for that (i.e., the performance of the entire sacrifice).
III.4.46 And because the Sruti (so)
III.4.47 There is the injunction of
something else, i.e., meditation, cooperation (towards knowledge) (which
is) a third thing (with regard to Balya or state of a child and Panditya
or scholarship), (which injunction is given) for the case (of perfect
knowledge not yet having arisen) to him who is such (i.e., the Sannyasin
possessing knowledge); as in the case of injunctions, and the like.
III.4.48 (On account of his being all,
however, there is winding up with the householder.
III.4.49 Because the scripture enjoins the
other (stages of life, viz., Brahmacharya and Vanaprastha), just as it
enjoins the state of a Muni (Sannyasi).
III.4.50 (The child-like state means)
without manifesting himself, according to the context.
III.4.51 In this life (the origination of
knowledge takes place) if there be no obstruction to it (the means
adopted), because it is so seen from the scriptures.
III.4.52 No such definite rule exists with
respect to emancipation, the fruit (of knowledge), because the Sruti
asserts that state (to be immutable).
CHAPTER IV: PHALA (Result)
IV.1.1 The repetition (of hearing,
reflection and meditation on Brahman is necessary) on account of the
repeated instruction by the scriptures.
IV.1.2 And on account of the indicatory
IV.1.3 But (the Sruti texts) acknowledge
(Brahman) as the Self (of the meditator) and also teach other (to
realise It as such).
IV.1.4 (The meditator is) not (to see the
Self) in the symbol, because he is not (that).
IV.1.5 (The symbol) is to be viewed as
Brahman (and not in the reverse way), on account of the exaltation (of
the symbol thereby).
IV.1.6 And the ideas of the sun, etc., are
to be superimposed) on the subordinate members (of sacrificial acts),
because (in that way alone the statement of the scriptures would be)
IV.1.7 Sitting (a man is to meditate) on
account of the possibility.
IV.1.8 And on account of meditation.
IV.1.9 And with reference to immobility (the
scriptures ascribe meditativeness to the earth).
IV.1.10 The Smriti passages also say (the
IV.4.11 Wherever concentration of mind (is
attained), there (it is to be practised), there being no specification
(as to place).
IV.1.12 Till death (till one attains Moksha)
(meditations have to be repeated); for then also it is thus seen in
IV.1.13 On the attainment of this (viz.,
Brahman) (there takes place) the non-clinging and the destruction of
later and earlier sins; because it is so declared by the scriptures.
IV.1.14 Thus in the same way, there is
non-clinging of the other (i.e., Punya or virtue, good works) also; but
at death (liberation, i.e., Videha-Mukti is certain).
IV.1.15 But only those former (works) whose
effects have not yet begun (are destroyed by knowledge; because the
scripture states) that (i.e., the death of the body) to be the term.
IV.1.16 But the Agnihotra and the like
(tend) towards the same effect, knowledge (liberation), because that is
seen from the scriptures.
IV.1.17 For (there is) also (a class of good
works) other than this, according to some. (There is agreement) of both
(teachers, Jaimini and Baadarayana) (as to the fate of those works).
IV.4.18 Because the text "whatever he does
with knowledge" intimates this.
IV.1.19 But having exhausted by enjoyment
the other two works (viz., good and evil works, that have begun to yield
fruits), he becomes one with Brahman.
IV.2.1 Speech is merged in mind, because it
is so seen, and there are scriptural statements (to that effect).
IV.2.2 And for the same reason all
(sense-organs) follow (mind, i.e., get their functions merged in it).
IV.2.3 That mind (is merged) in Prana (as is
seen) from the subsequent clause (of the Sruti cited).
IV.2.4 That (Prana) is merged in the ruler
(individual soul or Jiva) on account of the (statements as to the Pranas)
coming to it and so on.
IV.2.5 In the (subtle) elements (is merged)
(the Jiva with the Pranas) as it is seen from the Sruti.
IV.2.6 (The soul with Prana is merged) not
in one element only, for both (the Sruti and Smriti) declare this (or
IV.2.7 And common (is the mode of departure
at the time of death for both the knower of the Saguna Brahman and the
ignorant) up to the beginning of their ways; and the immortality (of the
knower of the Saguna Brahman is only relative) without having burnt
IV.2.8 That (fine body lasts) up to the
attainment of Brahman (through knowledge), because (the scriptures)
declare the state of relative existence (till then).
IV.2.9 (This fine body) is subtle (by
nature) and size, because it is so observed.
IV.2.10 Therefore, (this subtle body is) not
(destroyed) by the destruction (of the gross body).
IV.2.11 And to this (subtle body) alone does
this (bodily) heat belong, because this (only) is possible.
IV.2.12 If it be said (that the Pranas of
one who knows Brahman do not depart) on account of the denial made by
the Sruti, (we say) not so, (because the scripture denies the departure
of the Pranas) from the individual soul (and not from the body).
IV.2.13 For (the denial of the soul’s
departure) is clear (in the texts) of some schools.
IV.2.14 And Smriti also says that.
IV.2.15 Those (Pranas, elements) (are
merged) in the Supreme Brahman, for thus the (scripture) says.
IV.2.16 (Absolute) non-distinction (with
Brahman of the parts merged takes place) according to the statement (of
IV.2.17 When the soul of a knower of the
Saguna Brahman is about to depart from the body, there takes place) a
lighting up of the front of its (soul’s) abode (viz., the heart); the
door (of its egress) being illumined thereby; owing to the power of
knowledge and the application of meditation to the way which is part of
that (knowledge); the soul favoured by Him in the heart (viz., Brahman)
(passes upward) by the one that exceeds a hundred (i.e., the hundred and
IV.2.18 (The soul of a knower of the Saguna
Brahman when he dies) follows the rays (of the sun).
IV.2.19 If it be said
(that the soul does) not (follow the rays) in the night, we say (not so)
because the connection (of Nadis and rays) continues as long as the body
lasts; the Sruti also declares (this).
IV.2.20 And for the same reason (the
departed soul follows the rays) also during the sun’s southern course.
IV.2.21 And (these times or details) are
recorded by Smriti with reference to the Yogins and these two (Yoga and
Sankhya) and classed as Smritis (only).
IV.3.1 On the path connected with light (the
departed soul of the knower of Saguna Brahman travels to Brahmaloka
after death), that being well-known (from the Sruti).
IV.3.2 (The departed soul) (of a knower of
the Saguna Brahman goes) from the deity of the year to the deity of the
air on account of the absence and presence of specification.
IV.3.3 After (reaching) the deity of
lightning (the soul reaches) Varuna, on account of the connection
(between the two).
IV.3.4 (These are) deities conducting the
soul (on the path of the gods), on account of indicatory marks to that
IV.3.5 (That deities or divine guides are
meant in these texts, they are personal conductors) is established,
because both (i.e., the path and the traveller) become unconscious.
IV.3.6 From thence (the souls are led or
guided) by the very same (superhuman) person who comes to lightning,
that being known from the Sruti.
IV.3.7 To the Karya Brahman or Hiranyagarbha
or Saguna Brahman (the departed souls are led); (thus opines) the sage
Baadari on account of the possibility of its being the goal (of their
IV.3.8 And on account of the qualification
(with respect to this Brahman in another text).
IV.3.9 But on account of the nearness (of
the Saguna Brahman to the Supreme Brahman it is) designated as that
IV.3.10 On the dissolution of the Brahmaloka
(the souls attain) along with the ruler of that world what is higher
than that (i.e., the Supreme Brahman) on account of the declaration of
IV.3.11 And on account of the Smriti (texts
supporting this view).
IV.3.12 To the highest (Brahman) (the souls
are led); Jaimini opines, on account of that being the primary meaning
(of the word ‘Brahman’).
IV.3.13 And because the Sruti declares that.
IV.3.14 And the desire to attain Brahman
cannot be with respect to the Saguna Brahman.
IV.3.15 Baadarayana holds that (the
superhuman being) leads (to Brahmaloka only) those who do not take
recourse to a symbol of Brahman in their meditation; there being no
fault in the twofold relation (resulting from this opinion) and (it
being construed on the doctrine) as is the meditation on that (i.e.,
Brahman) so does one become.
IV.3.16 And the scripture declares a
difference (in the case of meditation on symbols).
IV.4.1 (When the Jiva or the individual
soul) has attained (the highest light) there is manifestation (of its
own real nature) as we infer from the word ‘own’.
IV.4.2 (The self whose true nature has
manifested itself is) released; according to the promise (made by
IV.4.3 (The light into which the individual
soul enters is) the Supreme Self; owing to the subject matter of the
IV.4.4 (The Jiva in the state of release
exists) as inseparable (from Brahman), because it is so seen from the
IV.4.5 (The released soul exists) as
possessed of (the attributes of) Brahman; (thus) Jaimini (opines) on
account of the reference etc.
IV.4.6 (The released soul exists) solely as
pure consciousness or Intelligence, that being its true nature or
essence; thus Audulomi (thinks).
IV.4.7 Thus also, on account of the
existence of the former qualities admitted owing to reference and so on,
there is no contradiction (between the two); (so thinks) Baadarayana.
IV.4.8 But by mere will (the liberated souls
attain their purpose), because scriptures say so.
IV.4.9 And for this very same reason (the
released soul is) without another Lord.
IV.4.10 There is absence (of body and
organs, in the case of the liberated souls) (asserts) Baadari, for thus
IV.4.11 Jaimini (asserts that the liberated
soul) possesses (a body and the organs) because the scriptures declare
(the capacity on the part of such a soul to assume) various forms.
IV.4.12 For this reason Baadarayana
is of the opinion
that the released person is of both kinds as in the case of the twelve
IV.4.13 In the absence of a body (the
fulfilment of desires is possible) as in dreams, as this is reasonable.
IV.4.14 When the body exists (the fulfilment
of desires is) as in the waking state.
IV.4.15 The entering (of the released soul
into several bodies) like (the multiplication of) the flame of a lamp
because thus the scripture declares.
IV.4.16 The declaration of absence of all
cognition is made) having in view either of the two states, viz., deep
sleep and absolute union (with Brahman), for this is made clear (by the
IV.4.17 (The liberated soul attains all
lordly powers) except the power of creation, etc., on account of (the
Lord being) the subject matter (of all texts where creation, etc., are
referred to) and (the liberated souls) not being mentioned (in that
IV.4.18 If it be said that the liberated
soul attains absolute powers on account of direct teaching of the
scriptures, we say no; because the scriptures declare that the liberated
soul attains Him who entrusts the sun, etc., with their offices and
abides in those spheres.
IV.4.19 And (there is a form of the Supreme
Lord) which is beyond all created things (because, so the scripture
declares) (His) existence (in a two-fold form unmanifest and manifest).
IV.4.20 And thus perception and inference
IV.4.21 And because of the indications (in
the scriptures) of equality (of the liberated soul with the Lord) only
with respect to enjoyment.
IV.4.22 (There is) no return (for these
liberated souls), on account of the scriptural statement (to that